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Ebola is a zoonotic ﬁlovirus that has the potential to cause outbreaks of variable magnitude in human
populations. This database collates our existing knowledge of all known human outbreaks of Ebola for the
ﬁrst time by extracting details of their suspected zoonotic origin and subsequent human-to-human spread
from a range of published and non-published sources. In total, 22 unique Ebola outbreaks were identiﬁed,
composed of 117 unique geographic transmission clusters. Details of the index case and geographic spread
of secondary and imported cases were recorded as well as summaries of patient numbers and case fatality
rates. A brief text summary describing suspected routes and means of spread for each outbreak was also
included. While we cannot yet include the ongoing Guinea and DRC outbreaks until they are over, these
data and compiled maps can be used to gain an improved understanding of the initial spread of past Ebola
outbreaks and help evaluate surveillance and control guidelines for limiting the spread of future epidemics.
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Background & Summary
The genus Ebolavirus belongs to the family Filoviridae and contains ﬁve known species to date that vary
in their distribution, reservoir hosts and their pathogenicity to humans. With the exception of Reston
ebolavirus which has only shown pathogenicity among primates and porcids, all of these have shown
some capacity to spill over from their natural reservoirs and cause human cases1,2. While only a single
human case of Tai Forest ebolavirus has been documented3, the remaining three species (Zaire ebolavirus,
Sudan ebolavirus and Bundibugyo ebolavirus) are all known to permit human to human transmission
after the initial suspected zoonotic transfer resulting in outbreaks of different sizes, geographic extents
and case fatality rates (Fig. 1)4,5.
Which reservoir species are responsible for maintaining Ebolavirus transmission between outbreaks is
not well understood6, but several candidate species have been identiﬁed. In Gabon three species of bats
(Hypsignathus monstrosus, Epomops franqueti and Myonycteris torquata) were found to be infected with
Ebola virus7 and some human outbreaks have been directly linked to bat exposure8. While it is
increasingly clear that gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) are dead end hosts for
the virus, infection in populations of these species is frequently found and they still present a risk of
animal to human transmission3,9–14. For many outbreaks it has been difﬁcult to deﬁnitively identify the
source of human Ebola index cases, but activities that bring humans into close contact with the blood of
mammals through activities such as hunting and the bushmeat trade are common to many of the index
cases8,14–16.
Following the initial suspected zoonotic transfer, secondary transmission can result from close contact
between infectious individuals or corpses and other humans, usually through exposure to infectious
bodily ﬂuids2. Due to the close degree of contact required for secondary transmission, certain speciﬁc
community activities are commonly associated with hotspots of secondary transmission such as family
home care, traditional burial practices that involve washing the corpse, or healthcare settings where
sufﬁcient protective measures are not in place15,17,18. These focal transmission events combined with an
incubation period of 5–9 days mean transmission can often be observed in waves of cases2,18 in both
space and time.
Spread of cases over longer distances is often associated with treatment seeking that draws people from
rural villages that typify the index case locations to big urban centres with central medical facilities
(Supplementary Figures 1–22). While this mostly involves domestic land travel19, some instances of
international importation by air travel have been documented18. Following travel of an infectious
individual, either secondary clusters of Ebola cases will occur, or transmission will be interrupted by
control methods such as quarantine and patient contact tracing20,21. Due to the variable rate of
progression of symptoms of Ebola virus disease (EVD) (onset of Ebola Haemorrhagic fever can range
from 2–21 days2), case fatality rates can vary signiﬁcantly depending on a number of factors associated
Figure 1. The size (a) and case fatality rate (b) of the 22 previous Ebola outbreaks (suspected and
conﬁrmed cases). Circle area is proportional to the total number of reported cases (a) or deaths (b) for each
outbreak. Circle colour represents different species of Ebolavirus. Black dotted lines in (b) show the median
and upper and lower 75% quantiles of outbreak case fatality rate.
www.nature.com/sdata/
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with Ebola virus pathogenesis and the quality and timing of symptomatic care. The complex interaction
between surveillance, control, treatment seeking, patient-contact rates and their combined effects on the
dynamics of transmission dictate the spread, magnitude and case fatality rate of an Ebola outbreak.
This database collates existing knowledge on the geographic spread of past Ebola outbreaks in a
standardised format that allows the dynamics of different outbreaks to be compared. Procedures for data
abstraction are outlined and each outbreak is summarised with a map and brief text description. These
data will be useful for conducting spatial analyses of Ebola outbreak spread. We include every outbreak
preceding the atypical 2013 Guinea epidemic which has spread further and faster than any previous
epidemic. Once the current Guinea and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) outbreaks are over,
this database will be updated to include the same standardised data ﬁelds for these contemporary
outbreaks. Periodic updates to include any additional Ebola outbreaks will also ensure this resource has
on-going relevance in Ebola spread analyses. In particular, a comparison between the Guinea 2013
outbreak and historical outbreaks will allow an evaluation of surveillance and control guidelines in terms
of their appropriateness for mitigating the spread of future Ebola outbreaks of variable magnitude. In the
meantime, it is hoped that these data will support research into EVD epidemiology which can be brought
to bear on the current outbreak.
Methods
Data collection
Tables listing proven outbreaks of Ebola virus, sourced from the scientiﬁc literature5 and from health
reporting organisations22, were used to coordinate initial searches of the formal scientiﬁc literature using
Web of Science and PubMed for each speciﬁc outbreak. Relevant papers were abstracted and, where
possible, outbreak-speciﬁc epidemiological surveys were sourced. The citations in these references were
obtained in order to reconstruct the outbreak in detail and extract a range of epidemiological data relating
to geographic spread, case and fatality numbers.
In this analysis we excluded ongoing outbreaks meaning that the current Guinea and DRC spread data
are not yet included. When this outbreak is over and data has been assimilated we will update this
database to incorporate the Guinea and DRC outbreaks using the same procedures described below,
which will allow a comparison with historical outbreaks of Ebola.
Deﬁnitions of index, secondary and imported cases
Index cases were deﬁned as any human infection resulting from interaction with non-human sources of
the disease. Among the sources examined, index cases were identiﬁed based on reported interaction with
suspected zoonotic reservoirs or hosts, such as non-human mammals during hunting trips8,14–16,23. In
cases where a mode of suspected zoonotic transmission could not be established, the ﬁrst reported case
was assumed to be the index case. Any cases arising from existing human infections are considered as
secondary infections. Cases reported after the index cases were assumed to be secondary cases unless they
were accompanied by speciﬁc details of likely exposure to a zoonotic reservoir or non-human host. If a
case was reported in an area where no further cases occurred and no continued transmission was
documented, these were termed imported cases.
Procedure for geo-positioning
For each index, secondary or imported case cluster that could be linked to a unique geographic location
we performed a range of procedures similar to methods employed elsewhere24,25 to assign geographic
coordinates. For index and secondary cases these locations were representative of the site of suspected
zoonotic transfer or human-to-human transmission respectively. Index cases were geopositioned as the
location where exposure to the suspected zoonotic reservoir was likely to be highest. For example hunters
who butchered carcases on hunting expeditions were geopositioned as a polygon covering the area of the
hunting trip not a point at the hunters’ homes. In contrast, if an individual purchased bushmeat from a
local market for preparation and consumption at home, the home of the individual was georeferenced as
the index case, as it was considered the location of highest exposure to the suspected zoonotic reservoir.
For imported cases these locations were representative of all locations that infected patients travelled to,
but did not cause onward transmission. For the purpose of this analysis we excluded international
imported cases that did not cause autochthonous secondary transmission as, in most cases, they
represented diagnosed foreign workers or expatriates who were evacuated for specialised treatment3,10. In
such circumstances appropriate preventative measures are employed meaning that risk of onward
transmission is negligible.
Each occurrence was reported to the highest degree of spatial resolution available based upon the
information provided, as long as they could be categorised into one of: index, secondary or imported cases.
This ranged from point locations (indicative of a precise location, such as a village), to areas, termed
polygon locations, which correspond approximately to administrative regions or custom digitised areas
based on site descriptors within the primary articles. Administrative regions were deﬁned as classiﬁed by
the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Global Administrative Unit Layers (GAUL) coding26. These
classify national boundaries as admin0 units, states or provinces as admin1 units and districts as admin2
units. By classifying Ebola occurrences as polygons we were able to represent the geographic uncertainty
around the exact location of Ebola transmission which could have occurred anywhere within the deﬁned
www.nature.com/sdata/
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region. For towns, the coordinates of the centre were recorded, unless a speciﬁc part of the town (or an
explicit latitude and longitude) was described. Coordinates for point locations were extracted using Google
Earth (version 7.1.2). If the area concerned could not be assigned to a ﬁner resolution than 5 km×5 km, it
was entered as polygon rather than point data. If speciﬁed regions could not be linked to an admin2
or admin1 unit, custom polygons were digitised using site descriptions in the text articles. For imprecise
descriptors e.g., ‘15 km from the town’ with no direction speciﬁed or ‘cases occurred on a north-south road
between village X and Y’, circular polygons were digitised based on radius distances given or extreme
points that deﬁned the geographic limits of transmission. These circular polygons could be trimmed if their
area included admin1 or admin2 administrative regions which reported no EVD patients. Some articles
referred to ‘healthcare districts’ that did not correspond to admin1 or admin2 units, but were deﬁnable
based on maps presented in the primary literature that were digitised or were available on the map sharing
website IKI (www.ikimap.com)27. For index cases that referred to suspected zoonotic transfer in speciﬁc
forests or game reserves, polygons were drawn based on the speciﬁed park or forest geographic boundary as
shown in Google Earth. Two exceptional cases were present. In the ﬁrst, for outbreak 13, the index case
transmission site description merely mentioned a case being reported as ‘near the town of Mbandza’. In this
instance a circular polygon was deﬁned with radius of half the distance to the next speciﬁed location of
transmission (7.5 km)15. In the second, for outbreak 9, two locations described in the primary literature
could not be located, but were described as ‘near to the town of Booue’18. As a result the same procedure
was undertaken and a radius of 30 km was deﬁned around the village of Booue. All digitising was
performed using ArcGIS 10.128.
Key outbreak metrics recorded
The total number of cases for each outbreak was obtained from the most recent primary source (Table 1
(available online only)). Cases included both clinically suspected and laboratory conﬁrmed cases at the
point of care, or diagnosed retrospectively. The number of people who died with a suspected or
conﬁrmed diagnosis of EVD was also recorded. These data were spatially disaggregated as much as
possible from the information given in the text to give measures of spatial variation in case fatality rate
within an outbreak.
Outbreak start and end time were deﬁned by reports of the ﬁrst (index) and last cases respectively. For
each secondary and imported case that occurred in a novel location, the source of importation was recorded
where reported. When possible this was reconciled with the date of the ﬁrst secondary or imported case in
each cluster to determine geographic spread order. We only included conﬁrmed sources of origin, as
determined by detailed patient histories, not suspected sources and no differentiation of spread order to two
new clusters from the same source was made unless both new clusters documented the date of their ﬁrst
secondary case. If two secondary case clusters had a conﬁrmed source but no differentiation of order we
assigned them the same spread order. Similarly if a secondary case cluster could have come from two
speciﬁed sources both were included as sources of spread. Due to a lack of epidemiological investigation at
the time, or through information being lost in the reporting chain, the spread order of many secondary and
imported case clusters was partially complete or missing altogether (Table 2).
For each outbreak the above details were combined with additional information from the original
articles on method and timing of spread to construct the text descriptions accompanying the spread maps
in Supplementary Figures 1–22 (selected examples in Figs 2,3,4). Spread is deﬁned as movement of an
infected individual from the location of infection to a transmission-free area. For example an individual
who was likely infected from the suspected zoonotic reservoir on a hunting expedition in the forest then
caused secondary infections back in their local village, would qualify as having spread the virus from the
forest to the village. By contrast if the ﬁrst reported case occurred in a village where subsequent secondary
cases then occurred, no spread would have been recorded as index and secondary transmission occur in
the same location.
Spread order (%) Source (%) Onset timing (%) End timing (%) Case data (%)
Complete 51 69 32 6 27
Partial 44 2 41 0 21
Unknown 5 29 27 94 52
Table 2. Completeness of epidemiological details among the 117 Ebola virus transmission occurrences.
Spread order is considered complete if the order of each occurrence in their respective outbreaks is known,
partial if their order could not be distinguished from every occurrence in each outbreak and unknown if their
order was unknown in the outbreak. Source was considered complete if spread could be linked to one source
occurrence, partial if spread is known to have come from one of a number of source occurrences and
unknown if source was unidentiﬁable (index cases excluded). Both onset and end timing were considered
complete if day, date and year was known, partial if just month and year was known. Case data was
considered complete if the number of cases and deaths was known, partial if either cases or deaths
was known.
www.nature.com/sdata/
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Selected examples are presented in Figs. 2,3,4. In the ﬁrst, initial focal infection jumped from village to
village, as well as longer distance dispersal primarily through treatment seeking of infected patients
(Fig. 2). In the second (Fig. 3) more limited outbreak, cases occurred in two main clusters, with one
containing working camps surrounding the site of suspected zoonotic transfer and the other villages and
a local hospital in the vicinity of Makokou. In the ﬁnal example outbreak (Fig. 4) secondary transmission
spread radially out from the village of Balimba following treatment seeking of a faith healer. Similar to
outbreak 1, infected patients travelled to local and national healthcare centres for treatment, in some cases
causing secondary transmission at great distances from the index case.
In the text descriptions, methods, sources and order of spread were described in a standardised
manner, where information allowed. A brief summary of the evolution of the outbreak over time and the
breakdown of total number of cases, deaths and case fatality rate over the course of the entire outbreak is
also given.
Figure 2. Map of the South Sudan (1976) outbreak. The ﬁrst reported cases of Sudan Ebola virus were in
three workers at a cotton factory in Nzara, in close proximity to three game reserves. The method of
acquisition was unknown. The ﬁrst secondary cases arose in Nzara infecting a total of 67 people who were
primarily family members of the factory workers. Further secondary transmission clusters emerged in
Maridi following spread from Nzara due to seeking treatment, after which further cases occurred in Juba
due to patients who were referred. Additional cases from Maridi were also referred directly to Juba making
the source of infection in Juba difﬁcult to identify. Secondary transmission also emerged in Tembura due to
a patient seeking family care, although the source of this infection is unknown. Imported cases from Juba to
Khartoum and from Nzara to Omdurman were also reported following a patient seeking treatment and a
referral for diagnosis respectively (see inset). The principal mode of transmission in this outbreak was
initially familial, although in Maridi secondary transmission arose through nosocomial transmission.
Seeking of treatment was the principal cause of geographic spread. The ﬁrst index case became ill on the
27 June 1976 before the ﬁrst secondary cases in July and subsequent secondary transmission clusters from
August to October. Cases peaked in September (138 cases, 65 deaths). The ﬁnal case was reported on
25 November 1976. Imported cases in Omdurman and Khartoum were reported in August and September,
respectively. Overall, 284 cases were reported with 151 deaths giving a CFR of 53.2%. This ﬁgure varied in
different locations: Nzara (67,31,46%), Maridi (213,116,55%), Tembura (3,3,100%), Juba (1,1,100%). Arrows
indicate order of spread. Where spread order is known, numbers are indicative of the order of spread.
Arrows sharing the same number indicate that it was not possible to distinguish which spread
happened ﬁrst.
www.nature.com/sdata/
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A wider-scale map showing the locations of all the outbreaks since 1976 is also available in
Supplementary Fig. 23 and a table detailing which type of data were obtained from which source for each
outbreak is given in Table 1 (available online only)3,8,10,13–18,20,29–46.
Data Records
The data from this analysis are summarised in two types of data format (Data Citation 1). First a data
table details unique geographic locations of Ebola occurrence, including information on type of
transmission, location, spread, timing and case number. These geographic locations are grouped into
individual outbreaks (n= 22) and summary statistics on timings and case and death numbers are given
for each outbreak. Second, geographic information ﬁles are provided that match the information
presented in the data table to explicit geographic areas. These are available in a variety of formats that can
be read by geographic information system (GIS) applications. Information from these two ﬁle types were
used to make the outbreak summary maps and text in Supplementary Figures 1–22 (selected examples in
Figs. 2,3,4).
Data table of unique Ebola virus transmission locations
The table includes the following ﬁelds, detailed below. The value ‘NA’ was entered if information was
unknown, unreported or indeterminable. The term ‘occurrence’ refers to Ebola transmission locations
that are either unique in the geographic location or in their type of transmission (index, secondary or
imported). Each row in the table represents a unique Ebola occurrence. A group of occurrences make up
contained ‘outbreaks’ and ﬁelds with the preﬁx ‘OB’ summarise various metrics related to the entire
outbreak that each occurrence belongs to.
UNIQ_ID: A unique identiﬁcation number for each occurrence at which index, secondary or
imported cases of EVD have occurred at unique geographic locations (n= 117).
NAME: Text description of the point or polygon that deﬁnes the location of the occurrence.
COUNTRY: The country where the majority of cases occurred in each outbreak.
VIRUS: The Ebola virus species of each outbreak.
Figure 3. Map of the Gabon (1994) outbreak. The ﬁrst reported cases of Zaire Ebola virus were in miners
from the Mekouka and Andock encampments, suspected to have contracted the infection in the
surrounding area. The method of acquisition was unknown. The ﬁrst secondary cases arose within these
two encampments and then spread to the Minkebe camp. Further secondary transmission clusters emerged
in Mayela then Makokou general hospital after 32 patients from the forest encampments sought treatment.
Cases were also reported in Ekataniabe and Ekobakoba who had recent travel histories to Makokou general
hospital. The principal modes of transmission were among workers at ﬁrst, followed by nosocomial in
Makokou general hospital and familial in Mayela (connected by a single traditional healer). The initial case
was reported on 13 November 1994 before secondary transmission clusters occurred from the end of
January to February 1995. Cases and deaths peaked in December (26 cases, 14 deaths (53.8% CFR)). The
ﬁnal case was reported on 9 February 1995 in Ekobakoba. Overall, 49 cases were reported with 30 deaths,
giving a CFR of 61.2%. For map key, see Fig. 2.
www.nature.com/sdata/
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CASE_TYPE: The type of transmission represented by the Ebola occurrence. Can be either ‘index’,
‘secondary’ or ‘import’.
DATA_TYPE: Whether the occurrence represents a point or larger polygon location.
LAT: The latitude of the centre point of the point or polygon of the occurrence.
LONG: The longitude of the centre point of the point or polygon of the occurrence.
LOC_NTS: Additional notes describing the site location of the occurrence.
SPR_ORDER: The order of spread between occurrences over the course of the outbreak, as
determined by the date of onset of the ﬁrst case in a given occurrence. Index cases are represented with
the value ‘1’. Two or more occurrences share the same spread order if it is unknown which of the two
areas Ebola virus transmission spread to ﬁrst.
SOURCE_1: The unique identiﬁcation number of the occurrence where the ﬁrst EVD patient
came from.
SOURCE_2: The unique identiﬁcation number of the occurrence where the ﬁrst EVD patient came
from. An occurrence may have more than one source if infected patients came from more than one
source but it is unknown which triggered secondary transmission.
SOURCE_3: The unique identiﬁcation number of the occurrence where the ﬁrst EVD patient came
from. An occurrence may have more than one source if infected patients came from more than one
source but it is unknown which triggered secondary transmission.
STR_DAY: Day of ﬁrst reported case in the occurrence.
STR_MNTH: Month of ﬁrst reported case in the occurrence.
STR_YEAR: Year of ﬁrst reported case in the occurrence.
END_DAY: Day of last reported case in the occurrence.
END_MNTH: Month of last reported case in the occurrence.
Figure 4. Map of the Gabon (1996b) outbreak. The index case of Zaire Ebola virus likely came from one of
three infected hunters in a logging camp near Mvoung. The timing of infection makes it difﬁcult to
distinguish index cases from secondary cases during the early stages of this outbreak, but it is likely that the
ﬁrst secondary cases emerged amongst the hunters who then sought treatment from a traditional healer in
Balimba. After falling ill, the traditional healer from Balimba sought treatment in Booue, where the disease
then radially spread through the communities in the surrounding areas. A further secondary transmission
cluster emerged in Libreville (see inset) after patients from Balimba sought treatment there. In Libreville
one doctor became infected and ﬂew to Johannesburg, South Africa for treatment before receiving a
diagnosis of Ebola. Limited further nosocomial transmission (1 case) occurred upon his arrival in
Johannesburg. Imported cases in Makokou General Hospital and Lastourville were also reported after
patients from Balimba sought treatment. No clear principal mode of transmission was observed for the
early stages of the outbreak, but in Libreville secondary transmission mainly arose through nosocomial
transmission. The index case was reported on the 13 July 1976 before the ﬁrst secondary cases in
September and subsequent secondary transmission clusters from September to January. Cases peaked in
September and deaths peaked in October. The ﬁnal case was reported on 18 January 1997. Overall 60 cases
were reported with 45 deaths, giving a CFR of 75%. For map key, see Fig. 2.
www.nature.com/sdata/
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END_YEAR: Year of last reported case in the occurrence.
REP_CASE: The total number of cases (suspected or conﬁrmed) reported over the course of the
outbreak, but only within the occurrence.
REP_DEATH: The total number of deaths (suspected or conﬁrmed) reported over the course of the
outbreak, but only within the occurrence.
OB_ID: A unique identiﬁcation number for each outbreak (n= 22).
OB_STR_DAY: Day of ﬁrst reported case of the outbreak.
OB_STR_MNTH: Month of ﬁrst reported case of the outbreak.
OB_STR_YEAR: Year of ﬁrst reported case of the outbreak.
OB_END_DAY: Day of last reported case of the outbreak.
OB_END_MNTH: Month of last reported case of the outbreak.
OB_END_YEAR: Year of last reported case of the outbreak.
OB_CASE: The total number of cases (suspected or conﬁrmed) reported over the course of the
outbreak in all areas.
OB_DEATH: The total number of deaths (suspected or conﬁrmed) reported over the course of the
outbreak in all areas.
Geographic information ﬁles
The geographic information ﬁles include index, secondary and imported cases linked to geographic
locations. All ﬁelds match those in the data table. Unknown, unreported or indeterminable data are
represented by the character combination ‘NA’.
Technical Validation
For each outbreak, all relevant text articles were used to conﬁrm or reach a consensus on the likely result.
Where differing results were found (e.g., total case count), ﬁgures from primary research articles took
preference over review, summary articles or periodical epidemiological reports.
The extracted geographic and epidemiological summary information was cross-checked by at least two
different researchers to ensure accuracy.
All point and polygon locations were checked in ArcGIS 10.128 against national and subnational
boundaries to ensure their location matched the text descriptions. A gridded raster ﬁle from the Global
Lakes and Wetlands Database47 giving the locations of rivers and lakes was also included to check points
and polygons fell on land rather than water. Any points that fell in water were moved to the nearest
land pixel.
Usage Notes
The data presented here can be used in combination with spatial and temporal meteorological and
socioeconomic information to generate hypotheses about the factors that may be important in the
emergence of index cases and the spread of secondary and imported cases of EVD.
Pigott et al. combined data on Ebola index cases with a suite of environmental information in a species
distribution model to map the zoonotic niche of Ebola transmission across Africa48. Matching more
varied and ﬁner scale local information at the sites of the index cases presented here could help develop
our understanding of the complex process of Ebola virus emergence and the risk posed by certain human
activities and land use patterns.
Using the secondary and imported case data, it would be possible to model and investigate causes of
spread of human Ebola outbreaks. Understanding spread of the pathogen in past outbreaks may aid
control of the current outbreak. A comparison between the spread of historical outbreaks and the spread
of the current ongoing outbreak once it is over will be useful for informing Ebola surveillance and control
guidelines to minimise the size and burden of these sporadic zoonoses.
Finally, this dataset can be used to investigate how the rate, extent and the environment in which
Ebola outbreaks spread relates to important outbreak measures such as the total number of cases and case
fatality rate. Understanding what distinguishes brief, geographically limited and low mortality Ebola
outbreaks from those that impose a much higher public health burden will be important for informing
future surveillance, control and treatment efforts49. This dataset provides the most comprehensive
collection of standardised data on Ebola outbreak spread currently available and will be an important
resource for these uses. These records will also be updated periodically with data from ongoing and future
Ebola outbreaks to ensure the ongoing relevance of this database.
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